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APPELLATE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In their primary briefs both Hebertson and Willowcreek Plaza 
failed to clearly state the appellate standard of review when 
faced with a trial court's entry of an order dismissing the 
complaint under Rule 12 or entering summary judgment under Rule 
56. Under Rule 12(b)(6) the order of dismissal is affirmed only 
if it appears to a certainty that Hebertson would not be entitled 
to relief under any facts alleged in support of her claims. 
Heiner v. S. J. Groves & Sons Co., 790 P.2d 107, 109 (Utah App. 
1990). Moreover, the appellate court must construe all 
allegations and inferences in the light most favorable to 
Hebertson. Id. Similarly, under Rule 56, Hebertson is entitled 
to have all the facts and inferences from those facts presented 
and considered in the light most favorable to her. Winegar v. 
Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d. 104, 107 (Utah 1991). 
INTRODUCTION 
The trial court improperly and, at very least, prematurely 
dismissed Hebertson7s claim against Willowcreek Plaza. The 
claims against Willowcreek Plaza should be reinstated and 
Hebertson should be given an opportunity to present her claim for 
compensation. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE ACTIONS OF DIME SAVINGS BANK AND VALLEY BANK 
& TRUST CONSTITUTE TRANSACTING BUSINESS TOGETHER. 
If the language of Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure is broken down, the first question that must be 
answered is whether Dime Savings Bank and Valley Bank & Trust 
were " . . . associated in any business either as a joint-stock 
company, a partnership or other association not a corpor-
ation . . .". The evidence presented to the trial court makes it 
clear that they were associated together in the business of 
owning and operating Willowcreek Plaza at the time Hebertson 
fell. 
Following the foreclosure of the property it is clear that 
the banks had a joint ownership interest in the property. In 
addition, both banks participated in making management decisions 
(e.g. appointing Milford Management as the leasing agent) about 
the property. Moreover, Valley Bank was the agent for the 
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parties in leasing the space, finding a manager for the property 
and collecting and disbursing rental income. Given these facts 
there is little question the relationship between Dime Savings 
and Valley falls under the definition of a "joint venture" found 
at U.C.A. §48-1-3.1: 
A joint venture is an association of two or 
more persons to carry on as co-owners of a 
single business enterprise. 
The statute goes on to state that the Utah General Partnership 
Act, U.C.A. §48-1 et. seq., governs the property rights of joint 
venturers. As joint venturers in the single business enterprise 
of owning and operation a piece of commercial real estate for a 
number of months, it is clear that Valley Bank and Dime Savings 
Bank were associating in a business that is not a corporation 
under the first step of the analysis under Rule 17(d). The only 
remaining question under that rule is whether the two banks 
" . . . transact[ed] such business under a common 
name . . .". 
II. THE FACTS CLEARLY SHOW THAT DIME SAVINGS BANK 
AND VALLEY BANK & TRUST WERE TRANSACTING THEIR BUSINESS 
UNDER THE COMMON NAME OF "WILLOWCREEK PLAZA". 
Both parties agree "Willowcreek Plaza" was the name of the 
complex where the plaintiff fell. Brief of Willowcreek Plaza, 
p.3. Both parties likewise concede that space was leased at 
Willowcreek Plaza during the time Valley Bank & Trust and Dime 
Savings Bank owned the property and that the leases for the space 
referred to the complex as "Willowcreek Plaza". 
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Willowcreek Plaza simply argues that jointly owning a 
commercial property that is held out to the public by a common 
name and entering into leases that refer to the property by that 
common name do not qualify as transacting business under a common 
name as required by Rule 17(d). Hebertson disagrees. In support 
of her position (and contrary to the bald assertion of 
Willowcreek Plaza), there is case law both in Utah and in other 
states holding that such activities do constitute transacting 
business under a common name. 
The case of Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499 (Utah 
1988), dealt with a claim by the Cottonwood Mall in its common 
name as the plaintiff to regain possession of leased property. 
The mall was not a corporation or a partnership but was 
specifically identified by the Court as a joint venture. In 
responding to the Complaint in Cottonwood Mall, the defendant 
moved to dismiss based upon the failure of the plaintiff to name 
the individual members of the joint venture as the real parties 
in interest under Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and the 
Supreme Court agreed. The Court held that Rule 17(d) allowed the 
Cottonwood Mall to sue under its common name. 
If the relationship between Valley and Dime Savings meets 
the definition of a joint venture under U.C.A. §48-1-3.1, 
Cottonwood Mall is impossible to distinguish from this case. 
Cottonwood Mall compels a ruling that property owned by a joint 
venture and known both between the joint venturers and by the 
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public as "Willowcreek i}xaza!l ma} It />LH M in Mn( ame. 
Moreover, Utah is not alone in so rulinq. Approximately 
nineteen states have analogous rules of civil procedure or other 
statutes tiidt illnv Mill • > h> bioufht 1^  * i i^ r-tinst 
unincorporated associations. While the specific wording of the 
various rules and statutes varies from state to state, at least 
two other states have likewise indicated that suit brought 
against an unincorporated association that holds itself out by a 
common name is acceptable. In White v. Cox, 17 Cal.App.3d 824, 
830, 95 Cal.Rptr. 259, 263 (1971), the Court held that the *ner 
of a condominium unit injured on the common grounds of the 
condominium could sue the unincorporated association of 
condominium owners by naming "Merrywood Apartments," the name of 
the condominium complex, as the defendant. In addition, the 
Nebraska Supreme Court in the case of Jansen v. Mundt, 30 N.W. 
53, 55-56 (Neb. 1886), held that under the terms of its rules of 
civil procedure the failure to specifically bring suit in the 
name of the individual owners of the business rather than 1 > the 
common name of the partnership was not a basis for a motion to 
dismiss. The Court indicated that any remedy for such an 
omission was in the nature of a motion requiring that the 
pleading be amended rather than to have the case dismissed. 
Cottonwood Mall, the California and Nebraska cases and the 
express language of Rule 17(d), are persuasive authority for the 
argument that naming Willowcreek Plaza as the defendant states a 
valid cause of action. 
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III. THE FACT THAT DIME SAVINGS AND VALLEY AGREED THAT 
VALLEY WOULD CONDUCT BUSINESS AS THE AGENT FOR BOTH DOES NOT 
CHANGE THE FACT THAT THE TWO BANKS WERE TRANSACTING BUSINESS 
UNDER THE COMMON NAME OF WILLOWCREEK PLAZA. 
As stated in the Hebertson's original brief, the fact that 
the leases were signed only by Valley Bank rather than by both 
Valley and Dime Savings provides no support to the argument of 
Willowcreek Plaza. There is no doubt Valley was acting as agent 
for both itself and Dime Savings. However, that agency 
relationship does not alter the fact that the two were doing 
business together and that "Willowcreek Plaza" was the name by 
which that business was known to the public and to tenants. 
Ford v, Williams, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 287, 289, 16 L.Ed. 36, 38 
(1858), states:: 
the contract of the agent is the contract of 
the principal, and he may sue or be sued 
thereon though not named therein . . . 
See Garland v. Fleischmann, 831 P.2d 107, 110 (Utah 1992). 
In short, the leases might just as well have had the name of both 
Valley and Dime Savings on them as landlords. The true nature of 
the joint venture between Valley and Dime Savings does not cease 
to exist just because Valley was the agent for the joint venture. 
IV. THE FACTS PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT AND 
THE INFERENCES THAT FLOW FROM THOSE FACTS STATE A CLAIM 
FOR RELIEF AGAINST WILLOWCREEK PLAZA AND RAISE 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT ABOUT WHETHER VALLEY 
BANK AND DIME SAVINGS BANK WERE A JOINT VENTURE 
AND TRANSACTED BUSINESS UNDER A COMMON NAME. 
Only in the most clear-cut circumstance should a case be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim. Heiner v. S. J. Groves & 
Sons Co., suHra. The facts presented to the trial court are more 
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than sufficient to create a basis to bring a claim against 
Willowcreek Plaza in that name. They create genuine issues of 
material fact
 doout the relationship between Valley and Dime 
Savings and the extent to which they held out the commerc lal 
development to the public by the name "Willowcreek Plaza". 
In its brief Willowcreek Plaza argues at some length about 
whether Hebertson properly requested time for additional 
discovery at the trial court level. However, Hebertson has never 
said that the Motion to Dismiss bet urn thf >i .ai court was 
granted regardless of her request for more discovery. Hebertson 
did not ask for additional opportunity to conduct discovery at 
the hearing before Judge Rokich, and she does not believe now 
that additional time for discovery was necessary. Hebertson is 
arguing that, based upon the information produced for the trial 
court, a sufficient factual basis exists to bring a claim Kjainst 
"Willowcreek Plaza" under Rule 17(d). It is also her belief that 
additional information will only verify the link between Dime 
Savings Bank and Valley Bank & Trust transacting business under a 
common name. 
The additional information is likely to include 
correspondence between the two banks regarding maintenance of the 
property, the amount of money coming in, who should manage and 
lease the property, the scope of Valley Bank's activities as the 
local agent for the two banks, what kind of compensation would be 
paid to managers and agents for the property and how it would be 
insured. All of these documents would likely show more clearly 
-7-
the fact that the property was known as "Willowcreek Plaza" to 
the owners, the tenants and the members of the general public. 
In short, there are genuine issues of fact about key questions in 
determining whether Valley Bank & Trust and Dime Savings Bank 
transacted business under a common name. In light of this, 
whether Willowcreek Plaza's motion to dismiss is treated under 
Rule 12 or Rule 56, dismissal of the case was premature at the 
very least. 
CONCLUSION 
Many facts indicate that Dime Savings Bank and Valley Bank & 
Trust were associated together in a joint venture and were 
transacting business under a common name. There are no facts or 
authority presented by Willowcreek Plaza other than its own 
argument to warrant upholding the trial court's order of 
dismissal. The Order should be reversed and Hebertson should be 
allowed to present her claim for compensation for the serious 
injuries she has suffered. 
Respectfully submitted this "2^ day of August, 1994. 
KING & ISAACSON 
Brian S. King 7 
Attorneys for Plainriff/Appellee 
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